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Elijah, a powerful prophet in the Old Testament, suffered despair and
depression.1  He prayed for death:  “It is enough; now, O LORD, take away my
life; for I [am] not better than my fathers.”2  He was neither the first nor the last
to have a mental illness.3  The estimates for the incidence of some type of
mental illness in the United States are remarkably high:  approximately one in
four.4  A few millennia after Elijah, people with emotional problems fortunate
enough to participate in the workforce have two potential bulwarks against suf-
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1 1 Kings 19:1-8 (King James).  Elijah has been considered the “loftiest and most wonderful
prophet of the Old Testament.” See Charles L. Souvay, Elias, in 5 THE CATHOLIC ENCYCLO-
PEDIA 381 (1909), available at http:/www.newadvent.org/cathen/05381b.html.  Even those
who follow the Baha’i tradition revere Elijah as one of the most important ancient prophets.
Simon Griver, The Baha’i Gardens, http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Society_
&_Culture/bahaig.html (last visited June 30, 2009).
2 1 Kings 19:4 (King James).
3 See generally Mental Health Client Action Network, http://www.mhcan.org/index.html
(last visited June 30, 2009).  The Mental Health Client Action Network (MHCAN) is a “peer
run, self-help, drop-in center where people with psychiatric disabilities can congregate and
socialize in a safe place, free from the stigma of mental illness imposed by society,” and
maintains a website called “Famous Crazy Folks.” Id. (follow “Resources” hyperlink; then
follow “Famous Crazy Folks – We are not alone” hyperlink).  Among those listed are:  Win-
ston Churchill, English Wartime Prime Minister; Alexander Hamilton, a drafter of the Decla-
ration of Independence; Copernicus, scientist; Charles Darwin, biologist; Kay Jamison,
professor and writer; Abraham Lincoln, U.S. President; Martin Luther, religious leader;
Michelangelo, artist; Napoleon, French Emperor and general; Nebuchadnezzar, king; Lord
Nelson, statesman; Theodore Roethke, poet; Ted Turner, entrepreneur; Mike Wallace, inves-
tigative reporter; Emile Zola, writer. Id.  According to the site, “[a]lmost no one was ‘Glad’
to be their friend until they became famous.” Id.
4 Nat’l Inst. of Mental Health (NIMH), The Numbers Count:  Mental Disorders in America
(2008), http://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/publications/the-numbers-count-mental-disorders-
in-america.shtml (describing the prevalence of mental disorders in America).  According to
the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH), “[a]n estimated 26.2% of Americans ages
18 and older . . . suffer from a diagnosable mental disorder in a given year.” Id.  Based on
the “2004 U.S. Census Bureau residential population estimate . . . this figure translates to
57.7 million people.” Id.  NIMH has also found that “[e]ven though mental disorders are
widespread in the population, the main burden of illness is concentrated in a much smaller
proportion—about 6 percent, or one in 17—who suffer from a serious mental illness.” Id.
Furthermore, NIMH claims, “mental disorders are the leading cause of disability in the U.S.
and Canada for ages 15 to 44.” Id.
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fering the pain described by the ancient prophet:  antidiscrimination protection
under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”)5 and health insurance.
However, the ADA has not been effective in mitigating the effects of discrimi-
nation upon the mentally ill, and health insurance coverage has been both dis-
criminatory and deficient.  Insurance plans and policies offer less coverage and
more limits on the mentally ill than on any other patients,6 and companies
almost never accommodate mental illness or tolerate the symptoms of those
diseases.7  Congress tried to address these shortcomings through the proposed
Mental Health Parity Act of 2007,8 an amendment to the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act (“ERISA”),9 the federal law that regulates most employee
benefits, to little avail.10  In the meantime, the Supreme Court made it more
5 The Americans with Disabilities Act purports to protect people with “physical or mental”
impairment.  42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A) (2006).
6 Rogers v. Dep’t of Health & Envtl. Control, 174 F.3d 431, 435-36 (4th Cir. 1999) (“Insur-
ers have historically and consistently made distinctions between mental and physical illness
in offering health and disability coverage”). See also GROUP INSURANCE 442 (William F.
Bluhm et al. eds., 2d ed. 1996) (“Most LTD [long-term disability] plans impose a lifetime
limit of 24 months on benefits for disabilities due to mental and nervous conditions when not
confined to an institution.”); U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, INTERIM
ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE IN THE APPLICATION OF THE ADA TO DISABILITY-BASED PROVI-
SIONS OF EMPLOYER-PROVIDED HEALTH INSURANCE 6 (1993), http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/
docs/guidance.pdf (“Typically, a lower level of benefits is provided for the treatment of
mental/nervous conditions than is provided for the treatment of physical conditions.”).  A
recent article in the American Medical News reports, “Many plans, for example, require
more prior authorizations or higher patient cost-sharing for mental health benefits than they
do for medical or surgical benefits.”  Doug Trapp, Mental Health Coverage to See Boost as
Long-Sought Parity Law is Enacted, available at http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2008/
10/27/gvl11027.htm (reporting a new law that should improve mental health benefits by
requiring parity with physical health benefits).
7 For a comparable discussion in the United Kingdom, see ROY SAINSBURY ET AL., DEP’T
FOR WORK & PENSIONS, RESEARCH REPORT NO. 513, MENTAL HEALTH AND EMPLOYMENT
(2008). See also Criado v. IBM Corp., 145 F.3d 437, 443 (1st Cir. 1998) (“Criado’s physi-
cian testified that if given a significant leave she could adjust to her situation and after he
experimented with medication she might return to her previous level of functionality.  This
evidence indicates that with a reasonable accommodation Criado could perform the essential
functions of her job.”).
8 Mental Health Parity Act of 2007, S. Res. 558, 110th Cong. (2007).  The bill was intro-
duced on February 12, 2007, and passed by the Senate on September 18, 2007, but died
when the House did not vote on the bill before the session term expired. See id.; 153 CONG.
REC. S1864-65 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 2007); GovTrack.us, S.558:  Mental Health Parity Act of
2007, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s110-558 (last visited June 30, 2009);
see also 153 CONG. REC. S1864-65 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 2007) (statements of Sens. Domenici
and Kennedy explaining the exploited loopholes of the Mental Health Parity Act (“MHPA”)
of 1996 and the intended effects of the MHPA 2007).
9 Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2006).
10 ERISA, passed in 1974, created procedural controls of all employee benefit plans and
exempted such plans from state control over the creation and administration of benefits. Id.
Firms with sufficient cash reserves or credit can self-insure their employees’ medical risks
and avoid state mandates and state taxes on premiums. See TIMOTHY STOLTZFUS JOST, DIS-
ENTITLEMENT? THE THREATS FACING OUR PUBLIC HEALTH-CARE PROGRAMS AND A RIGHTS-
BASED RESPONSE 185 (2003). See generally MANSEL G. BLACKFORD, A HISTORY OF SMALL
BUSINESS IN AMERICA (2d ed. 2003) (contending that most US governmental policies further
the interests of “big” business).
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difficult for those with mental illness to fit within the ADA’s protections.11
However, important changes to these laws could significantly improve the
lives of the mentally ill.  On September 25, 2008, President George W. Bush
signed the Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act (“ADAAA”) into
law.12  Less than one month later, mental health parity in employer-provided
health insurance became a federal mandate when the Paul Wellstone and Pete
Domenici Mental Health and Addiction Equity Act of 2008 (“Wellstone
Act”)13 was quietly enacted as part of the congressional economic bailout.14
The aforementioned new laws might actually bring society one step closer
towards ending discrimination against the mentally ill.15
At a time when the Obama presidency is framing the social issues for the
next half-decade, and when a woman accepted the Republican vice-presidential
nomination moments before cradling her special needs infant in her arms,
mental health is ever-present in the news.  That is atypical.  In over a dozen
years, no significant legislation nor federal agency has focused on the problems
11 See infra section II.A; see also Littleton v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 231 F. App’x 874, 876-
8 (11th Cir. 2007) (finding plaintiff, who was diagnosed with intellectual and developmental
disorders, not to be disabled under the ADA); Rohan v. Networks Presentations LLC, 375
F.3d 266, 273-78 (4th Cir. 2004) (finding plaintiff, who was diagnosed with post-traumatic
stress disorder, was not disabled as defined by the ADA); Johnson v. N.C. Dep’t of Health &
Human Servs., 454 F. Supp. 2d 467, 473-74 (M.D.N.C. 2006) (finding that plaintiff diag-
nosed with bipolar disorder was not considered disabled under the ADA); McMullin v. Ash-
croft, 337 F. Supp. 2d 1281, 1294-99 (D. Wyo. 2004) (finding that plaintiff diagnosed with
depression was not considered disabled under the ADA).
12 ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553.
13 H.R. 1424, 110th Cong. § 512  (2008) (enacted).
14 Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765,
3881.
15 Since most people obtain insurance as an ancillary benefit of employment, as unemploy-
ment has risen, the number of uninsured individuals has also risen. CARMEN DENAVAS-
WALT, BERNADETTE D. PROCTOR & CHERYL HILL LEE, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, POV-
ERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES:  2005, at 20-23 (2006),
http://www.census.gov/prod/2006pubs/p60-231.pdf.  In 2005, there were 46,577,000 people
uninsured. Id. at 22 tbl.8.  Of those, over 21,000,000 worked full-time. Id.  Nearly one-
fourth of the United States’ workforce is contingent or part-time, and only about twenty
percent of those employees have health insurance. Most Temp, Part-Time Workers Lack
Job-Linked Health Insurance, MEDICINEONLINE, Dec. 1, 2005, http://www.medicineonline.
com/news/10/6951/Most-Temp-Part-Time-Workers-Lack-Job-Linked-Health-Insurance.html
(“Only 21 percent of the 34 million part-time, temporary and contract workers in the United
States have [employer-provided] health insurance, compared with 74 percent of regular, full-
time workers. . . . ‘[Such widespread]non-traditional work arrangements, [require] new strat-
egies for affordable, comprehensive benefits,’ [Commonwealth Fund President Karen] Davis
said.”).  Firms that employ high proportions of female workers, part-time workers, and sea-
sonal workers “are known to offer health insurance less often, and when they offer it, they
are less likely to offer generous benefits.” GAIL A. JENSEN, EMPLOYER CHOICE OF WAGE
SUPPLEMENTS 35-37 (1986).  Besides gender discrimination, which crosses all race and color
lines, significantly higher numbers of other minorities are uninsured. DENAVAS-WALT,
PROCTOR & LEE, supra, at 21.  In 2005, the uninsured rates for non-Hispanic Whites at
11.3% and for Blacks at 19.6% were not statistically different from 2004. Id. at 21.  The rate
for Asians increased to 17.9% in 2005, from 16.5% in 2004, but the 2005 rate was not
statistically different from 2004. Id. at 22 tbl 8.  Among Hispanics, the uninsured rate was
statistically unchanged at 32.7%, while the number of Hispanics without coverage increased
from 13.5 million in 2004 to 14.1 million in 2005. Id. at 21.
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associated with mental health since David Satcher, former President Bill Clin-
ton’s Surgeon General, reported glaring disparities that violated not only civil
rights, but best medical and management practices.16  Until now, mental illness
demonstrated an almost irreconcilable conflict between economy and shame,
made even worse by stereotypical thinking that stigmatizes the mentally ill or
impaired.  “Treating people differently on the basis of mental illness does not
provoke the same moral outrage as that inspired by differential treatment on the
basis of race, sex, or even physical disability.”17
Society’s reluctance to treat individuals with mental illness with equality
leads to the loss of talents and makes it far more challenging for these individu-
als to contribute their accomplished skills to society.  This loss is simply ineffi-
cient and unjust.  Moreover, the spillover into the lives of families, co-workers,
and communities is harsh.18  Although not representing a solution to the prob-
lem that half of our population is uninsured, the ADAAA and Wellstone Act
might actually bring us one step closer to mental health parity in the United
States.
This Article examines these two new laws.  Part II provides a brief back-
ground on the ADA and describes the amendments to it in the ADAAA.  Part
III describes the Wellstone Act.  Part IV discusses positive effects the new laws
could have on easing stereotypes, lowering employer costs, and living in an
ethically better society.
II. THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES AMENDMENTS ACT OF 2008 AND
THE NEW MEANING OF DISABILITY
A. Overview of the ADA
Congress passed the ADA in 1990, with the intent of creating a civil rights
law to protect people with disabilities from discrimination based on disabil-
16 David Satcher, Preface from the Surgeon General, in U.S. PUBLIC HEALTH SERV., DEP’T
OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., MENTAL HEALTH:  A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL
(1999), http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/library/mentalhealth/home.html (containing the
statement of the Surgeon General referring generally to inadequate mental health benefits).
17 Elizabeth F. Emens, The Sympathetic Discriminator:  Mental Illness, Hedonic Costs, and
the ADA, 94 GEO. L.J. 399, 401 (2006) (“Mental illness tends to produce . . . ‘hedonic
costs’—an increase in negative emotions or a loss of positive emotions—in people with
mental illness.  And the hedonic costs of an individual’s mental illness may create hedonic
costs for nearby others.”).
18 According to Michael Faenza, President of the National Mental Health Association, an
advocacy organization for patients and professionals:  “[T]he bottom line is that people with
mental illnesses are the last [remaining] class of American citizens that are blatantly discrim-
inated against in any social institution.” Of Sound Mind and Body (PBS television broadcast
May 9, 1996) (transcript available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/health/may96/
mental_health_5-9.html). See Mathew G. Simon, Not All Illnesses are Treated Equally—
Does a Disability Benefits Plan Violate the ADA by Providing Less Generous Long-Term
Benefits for Mentally Disabled Employees than for Physically Disabled Employees?, 8 U.
PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 943, 976 (2006); Jeffrey Swanson et al., Justice Disparities:  Does
The ADA Enforcement System Treat People With Psychiatric Disabilities Fairly?, 66 MD. L.
REV. 94, 123 (2006) (comparing the success rate of ADA claims between people diagnosed
with psychiatric disorders and those with other impairments).
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ity.19  The ADA is a civil rights law that treats disability in a way similar to the
Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1968 with regard to race, religion, gender, and
ethnicity.  Operationally, however, the ADA works differently than the Civil
Rights Act.  People seeking ADA protection must first prove they are disabled
in order to be afforded protection under the Act.20
The ADA provides that “no covered entity shall discriminate against a
qualified individual on the basis of disability.”21  An employer discriminates on
the basis of disability if it does not make reasonable accommodations for an
employee’s disability, unless the employer can show the accommodations
represent an undue hardship.22  The ADA defines disability as:
(A)  a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more
major life activities of such individual;
(B)  a record of such an impairment; or
(C)  being regarded as having such an impairment.23
When the ADA first passed in 1990, advocates believed the language of
the Act and the legislative history would provide courts with enough guidance
to carry out the Act’s purpose.24  However, over time, courts interpreted the
Act so narrowly that its purpose seemed to get lost along the way.25  Many
courts interpreted the statutory definition of disability very differently than the
original advocates and drafters of the ADA envisioned.  Courts considered the
language of the statute clear and rarely looked to legislative intent for guidance,
which gave the courts room to interpret their own definitions of terms in the
Act.26  This reading resulted in decisions excluding individuals with diabetes,
19 Chai R. Feldblum, Kevin Berry & Emily A. Benfer, The ADA Amendments Act of 2008,
13 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 187, 187 (2008).
20 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2006). See also Chai R. Feldblum, Definition of Disability Under
Federal Anti-Discrimination Law:  What Happened? Why? And What Can We Do About It?,
21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 91, 94 (2000).  Those seeking the protection of the Act must
establish their own eligibility; any effort to diminish the severity of their conditions—likely
done in order to keep a job—might eliminate them from the protected class. See, e.g., Evans
v. Magna Group, No. 98-3125, 1999 WL 402401, at *2 (7th Cir. June 11, 1999) (“Evans has
failed to present any evidence that her OCD substantially limits any of her major life activi-
ties.  To the contrary, at her deposition she described her OCD as a ‘fairly harmless disorder’
and stated that ‘her condition did not in anyway prevent her from performing her job’ . . . .”).
See generally Christopher G. Bell, The Americans with Disabilities Act, Mental Disability,
and Work, in MENTAL DISORDER, WORK DISABILITY, AND THE LAW 203, 205 (Richard J.
Bonnie & John Monahan eds., 1997) (explaining that the ADA is largely self-administering
and enforcement depends largely on the employers’ conscience to make fair employment
decisions).  If such decisions are unfair, an employee with a psychiatric disability will be at a
disadvantage. Id. See also supra note 11, citing the most recent changes to the definition of
“who is disabled?”
21 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2006).
22 Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
23 Id. § 12102(1).
24 Feldblum, Berry & Benfer, supra note 19, at 187-88.
25 Feldblum, supra note 20, at 93.
26 For example, “the term ‘qualified individual’ means an individual who, with or without
reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position
that such individual holds or desires.”  42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). See generally Sharona Hoff-
man, Corrective Justice and Title I of the ADA, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 1213, 1215 (2003)
(arguing that the five percent win rate of ADA plaintiffs is attributable to the ADA’s flawed
definition of disability); Kathryn Moss et al., Unfunded Mandate:  An Empirical Study of the
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epilepsy, cancer, and muscular dystrophy from coverage under the ADA.27
Although distinct from mental illness, the exclusion of these illnesses from the
definition of disability under the ADA made it extremely difficult for people
who were diagnosed with mental impairments to seek protection under the
ADA.  Such categorical exclusions, rather than case-by-case analyses of
whether claimants thus diagnosed were actually disabled by their conditions,
seemed to flout the ADA’s original purpose.
Such applications of blanket disqualifications frustrate the intent of Con-
gress.  For example, in Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc.,28 the Supreme Court
read the literal text of the ADA to require “a person be presently—not poten-
tially or hypothetically—substantially limited in order to demonstrate a disabil-
ity.”29  The Sutton plaintiffs were twin sister pilots who wore corrective lenses
to remedy nearsightedness.30  The lenses corrected their vision nearly one hun-
dred percent.31  Even so, as eyeglasses-wearers, the court held that the plain-
tiffs’ employer was permitted to disqualify them from working as pilots
because of their visual impairments.32
The Supreme Court’s discussions of mitigating measures to correct a disa-
bility in Sutton must be read in factual context.  The Court ruled that the near-
sighted pilots were not “disabled” under the ADA because their vision was
presently corrected with eyeglasses, and thus they were not entitled to statutory
protection.33 Sutton was a bad case for the Court to determine whether disabil-
ities correctable with mitigating measures receive protection under the ADA.
Near-sightedness is easily, and often, completely and permanently remediable.
Bipolar disorder, on the other hand, may not be.  Moreover, eyeglasses do not
have the damaging negative effects many psychotropic drugs cause.  One could
speculate that a rational person may be unlikely to eschew spectacles to correct
poor vision and prescription drugs that lower blood pressure because such mea-
sures typically cause few side effects (and are among the best sellers in the
pharmaceuticals industry).  With such disorders, the disease itself does not
interfere with use of the corrective measure.  That is often not true in cases of
mental illness.  A truly afflicted individual may experience persistent psychiat-
ric symptoms that “prevent the person from having insight into the need for
medication.”34  Nearly all psychotropic drugs have physical or mental sequel-
Implementation of the Americans with Disabilities Act by the Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Commission, 50 U. KAN. L. REV. 1 (2001).
27 See McClure v. Gen. Motors Corp., No, 03-10126, 2003 WL 21766539, at *1 (5th Cir.
June 30, 2003) (plaintiff with muscular dystrophy not considered disabled); Orr v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., 297 F.3d 720, 722 (8th Cir. 2002) (plaintiff with diabetes not considered dis-
abled); Chenoweth v. Hillsborough County, 250 F.3d 1328, 1329 (11th Cir. 2001); Pimental
v. Dartmouth-Hitchcock Clinic, 236 F. Supp. 2d 177, 188 (D.N.H. 2002) (plaintiff with
cancer not considered disabled); Todd v. Acad. Corp., 57 F. Supp. 2d 448, 454 (S.D. Tex.
1999) (plaintiff with epilepsy not considered disabled).
28 Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
29 Id. at 482.
30 Id. at 475.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 476.
33 Id. at 482, 493-94.
34 Peter Weiden, How to Help Someone Who Stops Taking Their Medicines, http://
www.schizophrenia.com/family/compliance1.html (last visited Aug. 11, 2009).
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lae; such “persistent negative symptoms . . . interfere with motivation or energy
to follow through with medication.”35  The Sutton Court agreed, holding “nega-
tive side effects . . . of mitigating measures”36 are relevant in deciding whether
an affirmative duty to mitigate is a condition precedent to being disabled.
A few years later in Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Wil-
liams,37 the Supreme Court substantially limited what it considered to be an
impairment that affects a major life activity.  The Court determined an impair-
ment is “substantially limiting” if it “prevents” or “severely restricts” an indi-
vidual from performing a “major life activity.”38  It defined a major life activity
as one that is of “central importance to daily life.”39  Further, the Court held
that this requirement must be “interpreted strictly to create a demanding stan-
dard for qualifying as disabled.”40  This language clearly evidenced the Court’s
intent to limit the number of people who could qualify as disabled under the
ADA.
After Sutton and Toyota, the protections offered by the ADA became
much more tenuous and very few people qualified for protection under the Act.
As a result, Congress recently stepped in and enacted the ADAAA to attain the
original intent of the ADA.41
B. The ADA’s Application to Mental Illness
Pre-dating the 2008 Amendments, courts rarely found mental conditions
sufficiently severe so as to qualify as a disability; symptoms had to be persis-
tent.42  Plaintiffs could not qualify for accommodations if they “caused” their
disabilities, and were usually held responsible for being drug and treatment
compliant.43  As set forth in Sutton, if ameliorative measures managed an indi-
35 Id.  But see Joyce A. Cramer & Robert Rosenheck, Compliance With Medication Regi-
mens for Mental and Physical Disorders, 49 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 196 (1998), available at
http://www.psychservices.psychiatryonline.org/cgi/content/full/49/2/196 (finding fifty-eight
percent of studied psychiatric patients took their medications versus seventy-six percent
compliance rate for people with physical disorders).
36 Sutton, 527 U.S. at 484.
37 Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S.184, 193-94 (2002).
38 Id. at 198.
39 Id. at 197.
40 Id.
41 H.R. REP. NO. 110-730, pt. 2, at 2 (2008).
42 See, e.g., Rohan v. Networks Presentations LLC, 375 F.3d 266 (4th Cir. 2004) (finding
no disability status for an actress and singer with posttraumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) and
severe depression stemming from childhood incest and sexual abuse).  The case explains that
the plaintiff  “experience[d] significant mental distress when she observe[d] a parent scold-
ing a child, or when she [saw] or interact[ed] with a man who resembles or reminds her of
the likeness or mannerisms of her father, or sees such a man in a movie.” Id. at 269.  Inter-
actions of this nature caused the plaintiff “flashbacks or abreactions to when she was abused
as a child.” Id.  When the plaintiff “relive[d] the molestation, she experience[d] a variety of
physiological reactions, including (at different times) hyperventilation, inability to speak,
inability to open her eyes, gagging, bodily pain, and/or staring off into space.” Id.  The court
found that “[i]ntermittent manifestations of an illness are insufficient to establish a substan-
tial limitation on a major life activity.” Id. at 276.
43 See, e.g., Spades v. City of Walnut Ridge, 186 F.3d 897, 900 (8th Cir. 1999) (“The record
shows that Spades took medication and received counseling for his alleged disability of
depression.  He concedes that resort to medicines and counseling ‘allow him to function
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vidual’s disability, then the ADA offered them no protection, with courts often
blindly accepting a doctor’s treatment suggestions.44  Courts often read the
Act’s provision requiring a disability to “substantially limit” a major life activ-
ity as essentially disqualifying any person who is able to maintain a job from no
protection under the ADA, no matter how difficult it may be for the individual
to hold the job.45  If a plaintiff complained that his employer “regarded” him as
disabled, and therefore treated him adversely, he had no claim for accommoda-
tion unless he could also prove that he was, indeed, substantially limited.46
These perverted results may have resulted from poor drafting, judicial
obduracy, or prejudice.  As the First Circuit opined in an analogous Federal
Rehabilitation Act47 case:
A plaintiff . . . confronts a potential ‘Catch 22’ . . . She must show both that her
impairment substantially limits a major life activity and that she is ‘otherwise quali-
fied’ for her job, . . . In shorthand, the law requires the individual to be both substan-
tially limited and reasonably functional.48
A plethora of lawsuits and an avalanche of scholarly articles have failed to
create an unwavering taxonomy of activities that constitute “major life activi-
ties.”  Some litigation has focused on whether working is a major life activ-
ity.49  The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”)
without limitation.’  Thus, his depression is corrected and cannot substantially limit a major
life activity—a requirement for finding that an individual is disabled within the meaning of
the ADA.”); Keoughan v. Delta Airlines, Inc., No. 96-4072, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 12232,
at *3-6 (10th Cir. May 27, 1997) (The plaintiff, Ms. Keoughan, diagnosed with bipolar
disorder, had stopped taking her medication (lithium) for the disorder, and “the district court
determined that it was undisputed that Ms. Keoughan’s disorder could be controlled and
stabilized with lithium, and therefore she could perform all the essential functions of her job.
 Because the facts also show that Ms. Keoughan failed to take her lithium, the court granted
Delta’s motion for summary judgment.”); Siefken v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 65 F.3d 664,
665-67 (7th Cir. 1995) (A probationary police officer experienced a diabetic reaction while
on duty in his squad car which resulted in disorientation and memory loss, allegedly due to
his failure to monitor his insulin.  “[W]hen an employee knows that he is afflicted with a
disability, needs no accommodation from his employer, and fails to meet ‘the employer’s
legitimate job expectations,’ . . . due to his failure to control a controllable disability, he
cannot state a cause of action under the ADA.” (citing DeLuca v. Winer Indus., Inc., 53 F.3d
793, 797 (7th Cir. 1995)); Johnson v. Maynard, No. 01 Civ. 7393 (AKH), 2003 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 2676, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2003) (Plaintiff’s doctors reported “she had not been
complying with her outpatient treatment.  [Her] failure to take advantage of mitigating mea-
sures does not make her a qualified individual under the ADA.”); Bowers v. Multimedia
Cablevision, Inc., No. 96-1298-JTM, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19319, at *11 (D. Kan. Nov. 3,
1998) (“In this case, it is undisputed that plaintiff’s condition does not substantially limit him
in his major life activities when he takes his medication as prescribed.  In fact, his one panic
attack occurred after he had quit taking his medication without so informing his doctor.  The
plaintiff cannot gain ADA protection by unilaterally deciding, without justification, not to
use prescribed medication which corrects or alleviates his condition.”).
44 Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 482 (1999).
45 See, e.g., Johnson v. City of N.Y., 326 F. Supp. 2d 364, 368-69 (E.D.N.Y. 2004); Evans
v. Magna Group, No. 98-3125, 1999 WL 402401, at *2 (7th Cir. June 11, 1999).
46 Johnson, 326 F. Supp. 2d at 369.
47 Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 791 (2006).
48 Calero-Cerezo v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 355 F.3d 6, 22 (1st Cir. 2004).
49 See, e.g., Hoard v. CHU2A, Inc. Architecture Eng’g Planning, No. 06-15447, 2007 U.S.
App. LEXIS 15317, at *6 (11th Cir. June 27, 2007) (holding that plaintiff failed to establish
that his employer treated him as though his illness substantially limited his ability to work).
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Regulations define major life activities as “functions such as caring for oneself,
performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learn-
ing, and working.”50  The “Interpretive Guidance” to the EEOC Regulations
further note “other major life activities include, but are not limited to, sitting,
standing, lifting, [and] reaching.”51  The EEOC has also identified “[m]ental
and emotional processes such as thinking, concentrating, and interacting with
others” as other examples of major life activities.52
The Ninth Circuit adopted such a broad view of the term “major life activ-
ity” in denying an employer’s motion for summary judgment in McAlindin v.
County of San Diego.53  In that case, the plaintiff, a systems analyst, argued
that his employer violated the ADA when it failed to transfer him to a less
stressful job.54  The court held:
These evaluations suggest that McAlindin suffers from a total inability to communi-
cate at times, in addition to a more subtle impairment in engaging in meaningful
discussion.  His alleged “fear reaction” and “communicative paralysis” are suffi-
ciently severe to raise a genuine issue of material fact about his ability to interact
with others.55
The dissenting judge, however, articulated a common concern about the
mentally ill:
[N]ot only do we serendipitously create a mischievous Pandora’s box, but we then
open it with a flourish and invite into federal court all but the ‘cantankerous’ to sue
those employers with whom they cannot get along.  Employers beware, now you
may have an obligation at the risk of being sued to accommodate someone who does
not possess the ability to “get along with others.”  Not only is this “disability” vague,
but it’s bizarre, ominous, and wholly outside of the group of serious disabilities Con-
gress intended to cover with this statute.  Does this opinion suggest that a person’s
foul temperament may no longer be a reason to deny that person a job?56
50 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (2008).  The EEOC regulations define “major life activities”
broadly.
51 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630 (2008) (providing interpretive guidance on Title I of the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act).
52 U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 902.3(b),
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/compliance.html.  Agency guidelines and interpretations do not
have the force and effect of law; however, they do offer the court guidance. See, e.g., Mer-
itor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986) (The court frequently looks to EEOC
guidelines for guidance in discrimination cases, which, “‘while not controlling upon the
courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of experience and informed judg-
ment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance’” (citation omitted)); see
also Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 194 (2002) (“[W]e have no
occasion to decide what level of deference, if any, [applicable EEOC regulations] are due.”).
53 McAlindin v. County of San Diego, 192 F.3d 1226, 1235-36 (9th Cir. 1999).
54 Id. at 1230-31 (“McAlindin received a ‘provisional promotion’ in early 1989, which
brought new, very stressful duties.  In June 1989, McAlindin complained about a vendor’s
misconduct, yet his supervisors disregarded his complaints.  According to McAlindin’s
supervisor, McAlindin became agitated and started shouting in an accusatory manner during
the meeting.  Soon thereafter, McAlindin sought and was granted leave due to ‘work
stress.’”).
55 Id. at 1235-36.
56 Id. at 1240 (Trott, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See also Evans v. Con-
sumer Info. & Dispute Resolution, No. 05 Civ. 8252 (AJP), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26182, at
*38-51 (S.D.N.Y May 5, 2006).
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The majority of Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals have agreed with the
dissent.57  As the First Circuit has explained,
[t]he concept of “ability to get along with others” is remarkably elastic, perhaps so
much so as to make it unworkable as a definition.  While such an ability [i.e., getting
along with others] is a skill to be prized, it is different in kind from breathing or
walking, two exemplars which are used in the regulations.  Further, whether a person
has such an ability may be a matter of subjective judgment; and the ability may or
may not exist depending on context. . . . To impose legally enforceable duties on an
employer based on such an amorphous concept would be problematic.58
Case law illustrates just how intractable notions of mental illness may be.
For example, in Krocka v. City of Chicago,59 the Seventh Circuit sanctioned
what, for all intents and purposes, looks like the discriminatory treatment of a
police officer.60  The court explained that an ADA violation did not occur
where the police department forced an officer to participate in a mandatory
supervision program, typically reserved for officers facing disciplinary action,
after the officer revealed he was taking an antidepressant.61  The officer argued
that “his depression substantially limit[ed] his ability to perform the major life
activity of working,” and in the alternative, alleged an ADA violation because
the Department “regarded” him as disabled by requiring him to participate in an
employee assistance program usually reserved for officers with disciplinary
problems.62  Treating a worker as if he were disabled provides an alternate
basis for protection under the ADA.63  The Seventh Circuit draws a distinction
between limitations and disabilities, and has held:  “Employers do not run afoul
57 See McAlindin, 192 F.3d at 1234; see also Davis v. Univ. of N.C., 263 F.3d 95, 101 n.4
(4th Cir. 2001) (finding plaintiff with dissociative disorder could not claim that the ability to
get along with others is a major life activity).  Most of the cases on this issue can be found in
Jennifer N. Randolph, Note, Problem Employees:  “Merely Cantankerous” or Substantially
Limited in Their Ability to Interact with Others?, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 1135 (2006).
58 Soileau v. Guilford of Me., Inc., 105 F.3d 12, 15 (1st Cir. 1997).  Other courts have held
similarly, when a plaintiff requested accommodation for a psychiatric condition that required
time off from work. See, e.g., Criado v. IBM Corp., 145 F.3d 437, 443 (1st Cir. 1998).
59 Krocka v. City of Chi., 203 F.3d 507 (7th Cir. 2000).
60 Id. at 510.
61 Id. at 511.
62 Id. at 511, 513-14.  The court concluded that the district court did not error in holding that
Krocka was not substantially limited in a major life activity of working. Id. at 513.  The
court also concluded that Krocka did not provide sufficient evidence to establish his
employer “regarded” him as disabled. Id. at 514.  Therefore the court held the ADA did not
protect Krocka. Id. at 514-15.
63 Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 475-76, 489 (1999).  In Sutton, two sib-
ling pilots lost their bid for ADA protection due to severe myopia which disqualified them
from flying airplanes. Id. at 475-76.  The Supreme Court noted that in order to make out a
claim under the ‘regarded as’ prong, “it is necessary that a covered entity entertain mis-
perceptions about the individual.” Id. at 489.  These misperceptions may take the form of
believing “either that one has a substantially limiting impairment that one does not have or
that one has a substantially limiting impairment, when, in fact, the impairment is not so
limiting.” Id.  Reading Sutton’s statement of the ‘two apparent ways’ as exhaustive, the
Krocka court concluded that the police officer was neither perceived of as being disabled,
nor was he disabled. Krocka, 203 F.3d at 513-14.  The City did not consider Krocka dis-
abled; in fact they expected him to work. Id. at 514.  Officers who have run afoul of depart-
ment practices, like those who suffer from depression, might need a bit more help and
supervision. Id. at 514-15.
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of the ADA when they make employment decisions based on physical or
mental characteristics that are not impairments or that are ‘limiting, but not
substantially limiting’ such that they do not rise to the level of a disability
under the ADA definition.”64
Krocka deserves close examination because it gives a legal imprimatur to
irrational and discriminatory treatment by an employer.65  In the early 1980s,
Vincent Krocka joined the Chicago Police Department as a police officer.66  He
received a decade of good performance evaluations.67  In 1990, Krocka began
receiving medical treatment for severe depression, including taking Prozac to
alleviate his condition.68  As a result of the medication, his psychological con-
dition improved.69  He continued to receive good performance evaluations.70
Ignoring Krocka’s two years of successful performance while taking
Prozac, in 1992, the Department learned that Krocka was taking the medication
and placed him on medical leave pending the outcome of physical and psycho-
logical evaluations to determine his fitness for continued duty as a police
officer.71  After the evaluating physicians concluded that Krocka was fit for
duty, he was allowed to return to work, subject to the condition that he partici-
pate in the Department’s Personnel Concerns Program (“PCP”).72  Under that
program, the Department closely monitors participants to ensure no problems
occur.73  Department employees check in with such monitored officers
throughout each shift and often accompany them on radio calls.74  The Depart-
ment puts all officers taking prescription psychotropic medication in the PCP
because they are deemed to have “significant deviations from an officer’s nor-
mal behavior.”75  Labeling a well-performing police officer on a psychotropic
medication ‘deviant’ demonstrates stereotypical thinking.  However, the ADA
only protects the narrow class of employees who are, or are perceived to be,
disabled.  Simply thinking of those employees as deviant, or dangerous, will
not bring them within the aegis of the ADA.
Judges, as well as employers, may hold beliefs that contradict the spirit of
the ADA.  A Texas federal district court judge rejected the notion that getting
along with others qualifies as a “major life activity” in granting an employer’s
motion for summary judgment in Logan v. Nicholson.76  After a history of
64 Krocka, 203 F.3d at 514.
65 Id. at 511.
66 Id. at 510-11.









76 Logan v. Nicholson, No. H-04-4178, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34359, at *21-22 (S.D. Tex.
May 30, 2006).  This case was brought under the Rehabilitation Act, a predecessor to the
ADA with essentially identical proscriptions, but applicable only to federal employers.  The
Rehabilitation Act prohibits discrimination by a federal employer against qualified individu-
als with disabilities. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2006).  The Rehabilitation Act provides, in part,
“[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a disability . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his
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productive employment, the employer began to require the plaintiff to attend
staff meetings, which she characterized as too stressful.77  The plaintiff was
excused from the meetings for a short while and was allowed to simply read the
notes from the meetings.78  The employer eventually refused to continue this
accommodation because “her attendance at the team meetings was an important
part of her job duties.”79  The court agreed.  In so finding, the court failed to
address the implicit issue:  the woman had a serious illness, for which she faith-
fully sought treatment, which prevented her from working.  That, and only that,
disabled her.  Despite that fact, the court reasoned:
Plaintiff’s mental impairment caused her to experience stress in staff meetings which
were characterized by disagreements and raised voices.  Plaintiff does not argue, and
cannot argue given the facts in the record, that she is substantially limited in her
ability to interact or communicate with others on a very basic level.
The court cannot subscribe to the view that Plaintiff’s professed mood swings
and stress-related symptoms experienced in contentious staff meetings are significant
limitations to any major life activity . . . .80
Accordingly, the court held that an accommodation was not legally
required despite the plaintiff’s inability to keep working for her current
employer.81
In Bell v. Gonzalez,82 a district court granted an employer’s motion to
dismiss an ADA claim by a federal worker with Tourette’s Syndrome, finding
that his illness did not significantly impair him.83  Tourette’s Syndrome is a
neurological disorder that manifests itself at an early pre-teen age and it is
characterized by verbal and motor tics.84  Co-workers or employers are likely
disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any program or activity . . . conducted by any Executive agency . . . .”
Id.  In order to state a claim for relief under the Rehabilitation Act, a plaintiff must prove
that he or she:  (1) was an “individual with handicaps”; (2) was “otherwise qualified”; (3)
worked for a “program or activity” receiving federal financial assistance; and (4) was
“adversely treated solely because of his handicap.”  Chandler v. City of Dallas, 2 F.3d 1385,
1390 (5th Cir. 1993).  The Rehabilitation Act incorporates the standards used in ADA cases,
which are subject to the Title VII burden-shifting analysis.  Daigle v. Liberty Life Ins. Co.,
70 F.3d 394, 396 (5th Cir. 1995). See also Daugherty v. City of El Paso, 56 F.3d 695, 697-
98 (5th Cir. 1995).
77 Logan, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34359, at *3.
78 Id. at *4.
79 Id. at *3.
80 Id. at *22 (major life activity as recognized by the Federal Rehabilitation Act). See supra
note 41.
81 Logan, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34359, at *22-23.
82 Bell v. Gonzalez, 398 F. Supp. 2d 100 (D.D.C. 2005).
83 Id. at 101-02.  The court must focus on whether the plaintiff, “through the exercise of his
own skills, is capable of communicating with others, in contrast to examining whether others
wish to avoid interacting with him because of his impairment.” Id. at 101.  Essentially this
means that if he can talk, even if no one will listen, he is not disabled—even if he cannot
work. See Criado v. IBM Corp., 145 F.3d 437, 443 (1st Cir. 1998) (“Criado’s physician
testified that if given a significant leave she could adjust to her situation and after he experi-
mented with medication she might return to her previous level of functionality.  This evi-
dence indicates that with a reasonable accommodation Criado could perform the essential
functions of her job.”).
84 Nat’l Tourette Syndrome Ass’n, What is Tourette Syndrome?, http://www.tsa-usa.org/
Medical/whatists.html (last visited Aug. 11, 2009).
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to feel strong reactions to a person with Tourette’s Syndrome.85  However,
Tourette’s is very rarely physically disabling, and “[m]ost people with [Tou-
rette’s Syndrome] . . . will lead productive lives.”86  Experts blame “social
attitudes” and ignorance for lost opportunities those with the illness suffer.87
Many employers could accommodate an individual with Tourette’s Syndrome
by reassignment, providing “tic” breaks, and educating the workforce about the
illness.88  The Bell court seemed to appreciate the unfairness and potential dis-
crimination, but it nonetheless ruled against the plaintiff.89
Measuring whether a plaintiff is ‘substantially limited’ in interacting with others
through the reactions of society would result in defining a disability based on the
subjective and varied range of reactions of the persons with whom a plaintiff happens
to come into contact, and would focus the inquiry away from a plaintiff’s own
abilities.90
These lower court decisions followed the lead of the United States
Supreme Court, further narrowing the ADA’s protections in a manner contrary
to its legislative purpose.91
C. Overview of the ADAAA
The ADAAA attempts to expand protections for the disabled by broaden-
ing the scope of persons considered to be disabled and clarifying the original
intent of the ADA.92  Eighteen years after the passage of the ADA, “many
individuals with physical and mental impairments whom Congress intended to
protect are not covered under the law, due to a series of Supreme Court deci-
sions interpreting the definition of disability.”93  The House Report accompa-
nying the ADAAA demonstrates:  “The purpose of the bill is to restore
protection for the broad range of individuals with disabilities as originally envi-
sioned by Congress by responding to the Supreme Court’s narrow interpreta-
tion of the definition of disability.”94  The language of the ADA itself
instructed courts and the EEOC to read the Act broadly.95
Congress specifically addressed and amended several parts of the ADA,
four of which are crucial for employees with psychiatric illnesses.96  The
ADAAA redefines a “disability” as an impairment that is episodic or in remis-
sion, if the impairment substantially limits a major life activity when active.97
85 Mitzi Waltz, Nat’l Tourette Syndrome Ass’n, Employment:  Getting a Job and Keeping
It, http://www.tsa-usa.org/People/LivingWithTS/Employment.htm (last visited Aug. 11,
2009).
86 Nat’l Tourette Syndrome Ass’n, supra note 84.
87 Waltz, supra note 85.
88 Id.
89 Bell v. Gonzalez, 398 F. Supp. 2d 100, 102 (D.D.C. 2005).
90 Id. at 101.
91 H.R. REP. NO. 110-730, pt. 2, at 5-6 (2008).
92 ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2, 122 Stat. 3553, 3553 (amend-
ing the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990).
93 H.R. REP. NO. 110-730, pt. 1, at 7 (2008).
94 H.R. REP. NO. 110-730, pt. 2, at 5.
95 ADA Amendments Act of 2008 § 2.
96 Id.
97 Id. § 4 (explaining amendments to section three of the American with Disabilities Act of
1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2006)).
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Under the ADAAA, Congress liberalized the meaning of “substantially lim-
its”98 and broadened the list of “major life activities.”99  It instructs that disabil-
ities can include impairments that are episodic or controlled by drugs, therapy
or learned behavioral, or adaptive neurological modifications.100  The Act also
explicitly reverses Sutton by directing courts not to consider mitigating mea-
sures when determining whether an impairment substantially limits a major life
activity.101  However, Congress made an exception in allowing for the consid-
eration of the mitigating measures of corrective lenses and eyeglasses.102
The ADAAA also allows a plaintiff to be “regarded as” disabled if she is
treated adversely in the workplace because of her employer’s belief that she has
a mental disability, even if she does not.103  Further, in the Act’s “Findings and
Purposes,” Congress states that judicial and agency interpretations have elimi-
nated “protection for many individuals Congress intended to protect,” that
courts read “the term ‘substantially limits’ to require a greater degree of limita-
tion” than the original ADA intended, and thus the Act redefines the term to
mean “materially restricts.”104  The House Report accompanying the Act stated
that:
The Committee intends to lessen the standard of establishing whether an indi-
vidual has a disability for purposes of coverage under the ADA, and to refocus the
question on whether discrimination on the basis of disability occurred. . . .
. . . .
Too often cases have turned solely on the question of whether the plaintiff is an
individual with a disability; too rarely have courts considered the merits of the dis-
crimination claim, such as whether adverse decisions were impermissibly made by
the employer on the basis of disability, reasonable accommodations were denied
inappropriately, or qualification standards were unlawfully discriminatory.105
Congress further clarified that it did not intend for the threshold question
of disability to be used as a means of excluding individuals from coverage.106
Finally, Congress expanded the statutory language to clarify that “major life
activities” include many symptoms of mental illness:  “sleeping . . . speaking,
breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating and
working.”107
98 Id. § 3.
99 Id.
100 Id. § 4.
101 Id. §§ 2, 4 (explaining amendments to section three of the American with Disabilities
Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2006)).
102 Id.  Nevertheless, the Act provides “a covered entity shall not use qualification stan-
dards, employment tests, or other selection criteria based on an individual’s uncorrected
vision unless the standard, test, or other selection criteria, as used by the covered entity, is
shown to be job-related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity.”
Id. § 5.
103 Id. § 4 (explaining amendments to section three of the American with Disabilities Act of
1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2006)).
104 Id. § 3(2). See also H.R. REP. NO. 110-730, pt. 1, at 2 (2008) (“The term ‘substantially
limits’ means materially restricts”).
105 H.R. REP. NO. 110-730, pt. 1, at 7-8.
106 Id. at 16-17.
107 Id. at 27.
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The ADAAA dramatically expands the definition of disability, providing
protection for many more people than previously available under the ADA.
Although the Act brings society one step closer to protecting the mentally and
physically disabled from discrimination, more steps are required to completely
eliminate the discriminatory effects the disabled suffer throughout their lives.
D. The ADAAA Does Not Prohibit Employers From Requiring Non-
Medical Tests as a Means of Identifying Certain Traits Affecting
Work-Related Criteria
Despite its benefits, the ADAAA does not appear to include legislation
prohibiting employers from requiring employees (or potential employees) to
take non-medical tests identifying certain traits that could affect work-related
criteria.  Considering that legislation is silent on this issue, courts may assume
Congress had no intention to amend the EEOC’s “testing” exception to the
ADA.  The ADA prohibited an employer from asking questions of an applicant
seeking to discover disabilities.108  Nor could the employer require medical
examinations of an applicant until after an offer of employment had been made
to the applicant.109  However, the EEOC provided an exception:  “[T]ests used
to identify such traits as poor judgment, chronic lateness, impulse control . . .
are not medical tests.”110
In answer to a written inquiry asking whether an employer could use a
handwriting sample or psychological test to screen for “personality traits/char-
acteristics such as a tendency towards a quick temper, inability to concentrate
on projects, [or] slow v. quick thinking processes,”111 the EEOC provided an
equivocal answer:
[P]sychological tests are medical if they provide evidence that would lead to identify-
ing a mental disorder or impairment, such as those listed in the Diagnostic and Statis-
tical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV).  For example, a test designed to reveal
whether a characteristic such as ‘slow’ thinking or ‘inability to concentrate’ is the
result of a mental or psychological impairment is a medical examination.  By con-
trast, tests that are designed and used to measure traits or characteristics such as
honesty, tastes, and habits are not ‘medical.’112
In Karraker v. Rent-A-Center, Inc.,113 the Seventh Circuit decided using
the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI) as an employment
screen constituted discrimination under the ADA.114  The court reiterated the
108 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d) (2006).
109 Id. § 12112(d)(1)-(2).
110 Letter from Joyce Walker-Jones, Acting Assistant Legal Cousel, ADA Policy Division,
U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n, to member of the public (July 1, 2003)
(available at http://www.eeoc.gov/foia/letters/2003/ada_pre-offer_exams.html). See U.S.
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, NOTICE 915.002:  ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE
ON THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT AND PSYCHIATRIC DISABILITIES (1997), availa-
ble at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/psych.html.
111 Letter from Joyce Walker-Jones, supra note 110.
112 Id.
113 Karraker v. Rent-A-Center, Inc., 411 F.3d 831 (7th Cir. 2005).
114 Id. at 837; Karraker v. Rent-A-Center, Inc., 492 F.3d 896, 897 (7th Cir. 2007) (awarding
attorneys’ fees to plaintiff when, after remand, the district court ordered the company-wide
destruction of all MMPI test results); Karraker v. Rent-A-Center, Inc., 431 F. Supp. 2d 883
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salutary purposes of the ADA to be “the elimination of discrimination against
individuals with disabilities.”115  The court also recognized Congress’ attempt
to remedy “attitudinal barriers resulting from unfounded stereotypes and
prejudice.”116  Despite such mellifluous proclamations, another case, Ward v.
Merck & Co.,117 involving a chemist fired for refusing to submit to a fitness-
for-duty mental health examination by company doctors did not amount to a
violation.118  In that case, the court did not find impermissible discrimination
because the employee’s odd behavior created a legitimate business reason for
the exam;119 his co-worker described him as “walking around like he’s a
zombie.”120
Although the ADA prohibited tests that “screen out (or tend to screen out)
people with disabilities,”121 employers can administer medical tests that are
“job-related and consistent with business necessity.”122  Thus, a description of
a worker as a “zombie” created a reason for discharge.123  Congress did not
appear to rectify this problem in drafting the ADAAA.  In essence, employers
could potentially continue to use these tests to weed out the mentally disabled if
they can find a legitimate business interest for requiring an employee to take a
non-medical test that attempts to measure a type of behavior.
The sum total of disability jurisprudence represents a wholesale failure to
accommodate mental illness.  Results contradict the ADAAA’s mandate that
employers tolerate such unique disabilities.  The disability law utilizes “a dif-
ference model,” rather than a formal equality standard, under which an
employer is required to the treat all employees the same, regardless of race,
gender, or national origin.124  As a result, one scholar notes, “individuals seek-
ing reasonable accommodation run into resistance from courts that view
accommodations as a form of preferential treatment not unlike affirmative
(C.D. Ill. 2006). See also Jennifer Gonzales-Frisbie, Comment, Personality Tests In Jeop-
ardy:  An Evaluation of the Seventh Circuit’s Decision in Karraker v. Rent-A-Center and Its
Impact on the Future Use of Personality Tests in Pre-Employment Screening, 9 U. PA. J.
LAB. & EMP. L. 185, 187 (2006).  The MMPI might be the “most popular personality test in
the world” and used by many employers, although it was created in the 1930s to help diag-
nose psychiatric disorders. Id.
115 Karraker, 411 F.3d at 834 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(1) (2006)).
116 Id.  Employees have had mixed results in challenging the use of these tests in other
federal and state courts. See generally 9 LEX K. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
§ 154.07 (2d ed. 2009).
117 Ward v. Merck & Co., 226 F. App’x 131 (3d Cir. 2007).
118 Id. at 132-33.
119 Id. at 138-39.
120 Id. at 137.
121 Karraker, 411 F.3d at 834.
122 Id. at 835.
123 Ward, 226 F. App’x at 137.
124 See Pamela S. Karlan & George Rutherglen, Disabilities, Discrimination, and Reasona-
ble Accommodation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1, 10-11 (1996) (stating the ADA “requires employers to
treat some individuals . . . differently than other individuals”). Cf. 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a)
(2006), unconstitutional as applied by Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520 F.3d 198, 209 (2d Cir.
2008), limited on constitutional grounds by Miller v. Bay View United Methodist Church,
Inc. 141 F. Supp. 2d 1174, 1180 (E.D. Wis. 2001).
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action.”125  The ADAAA does not prevent employers from using personality
tests as proxies for discrimination.  Perhaps, the EEOC will address this issue
when it provides guidelines for the ADAAA, but as of yet, individuals with
mental disabilities or illnesses remain vulnerable to discrimination in
employment.
III. PAUL WELLSTONE AND PETE DOMENICI MENTAL HEALTH PARITY AND
ADDICTION EQUITY ACT
A. Overview of the Law
The Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and Addic-
tion Equity Act (“Wellstone Act”) passed as part of the Emergency Economic
Stabilization Act of 2008.126  The Wellstone Act does not mandate benefits, but
it states that if benefits are provided by any employer, “the financial require-
ments applicable to such mental health or substance use disorder benefits” and
the “treatment limitations” can be “no more restrictive than the predominant
financial requirements applied to substantially all medical and surgical bene-
fits covered by the plan.”127
Additionally, the Act provides that employers cannot implement “cost
sharing requirements,” separate treatment limitations that are applicable only
with respect to mental health or substance use disorder benefits.128  The law
defines “‘financial requirement’ [to include] deductibles, copayments, coinsur-
ance, and out-of-pocket expenses.”129  “The term ‘treatment limitation’
includes limits on the frequency of treatment, number of visits, days of cover-
age, or other similar limits on the scope or duration of treatment.”130  Although
employers may choose not to offer any mental health insurance, if they cover
psychiatric, emotional, or substance abuse disorders, parity rules apply.
Federal officials estimate the Wellstone Act will improve mental health
coverage for at least 113 million people.131  The Congressional Budget Office
estimates the Wellstone Act will only “increase premiums by an average of
about two-tenths of 1 percent.”132
The Wellstone Act amends the 1996 Mental Health Parity Act
(“MHPA”),133 a limited measure that simply requires group health plans to
equalize lifetime and annual dollar limits for mental health and other covered
125 Cheryl L. Anderson, What is “Because of the Disability” under the Americans with
Disabilities Act? Reasonable Accommodation, Causation, and the Windfall Doctrine, 27
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 323, 325 (2006) (citing Equal Employment Opportunity
Comm’n v. Humiston-Keeling, Inc., 227 F.3d 1024, 1029 (7th Cir. 2000) (calling a reasona-
ble accommodation claim “affirmative action with a vengeance”)).
126 H.R. 1424, 110th Cong. § 512  (2008) (enacted).




131 Robert Pear, Equal Coverage for Mental and Physical Ailments Is Required in Bailout
Law, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2008, at A13.
132 Id.
133 Mental Health Parity Act of 1996, 29 U.S.C. § 1185a (2006).
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benefits.134  Neither the original nor the amended laws mandate benefits, and
the laws only apply to self-insured plans covered by ERISA and exclude
employers with fewer than fifty covered employees.135  Until 2010, when the
Wellstone Act becomes effective, employer plans are allowed to limit mental
health benefits, financial requirements can be disparate, and benefits for sub-
stance abuse and chemical dependency are explicitly exempt from parity
requirements.136  Under the MHPA, plans can exclude certain categories of
mental illness from coverage, and benefits for substance abuse and chemical
dependency are explicitly exempt from parity requirements.137  Any business
could apply for an exemption to the MHPA if it could demonstrate that compli-
ance with the law would increase its overall group health plan costs by more
than one percent.138
Unfortunately, the MHPA did not illegalize many of the tools used by
health insurers to limit mental health coverage, such as higher co-payments and
deductibles, and lower limits on inpatient days and outpatient visits.139  Even
though one required only moderate changes in benefits for the mentally ill,
Congress debated this initial measure for four years before making the MHPA
law.140
Significant disparities allowed under the MHPA are those the new Well-
stone Act is intended to remedy.  The new law retains the small employer and
economic hardship exemptions.141  Large employers enjoy enormous subsidi-
zation:  the United States tax expenditure reflects what the federal government
134 Maggie D. Gold, Must Insurers Treat All Illnesses Equally?—Mental vs. Physical Ill-
nesses:  Congressional and Administrative Failure to End Limitations to and Exclusions
from Coverage for Mental Illness in Employer-Provided Health Benefits Under the Mental
Health Parity Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 767, 771
(1998) (“[I]dealistic access goals bargained away and dismantled by cost-containment
concerns.”).
135 29 U.S.C. § 1185a.
136 See generally Beth Mellen Harrison, Recent Development, Mental Health Parity, 39
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 255 (2002).
137 U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Mental Health Benefits, http://www.dol.gov/dol/topic/health-plans/
mental.htm (last visited Aug. 12, 2009).
138 See generally U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Frequently Asked Questions About the Mental
Health Parity Act, http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/faqs/faq_consumer_mentalhealthparity.html (last
visited Aug. 12, 2009).
139 Data showed that insurers used these limits to offset the cost of parity in lifetime and
annual benefits.  Robert Pear, House Approves Bill on Mental Health Parity, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 6, 2008, at A14.
140 On May 12, 1992, during the 102nd Congress Senators Pete Domenici and John Dan-
forth first introduced mental health parity legislation.  Equitable Health Care for Severe
Mental Illnesses Act of 1992, S. 2696, 102d Cong. (1992).  “On July 18, 2007, the Commit-
tee on Education and Labor met to markup House Bill 1424, the Paul Wellstone Mental
Health and Addiction Equity Act of 2007.” H.R. REP. NO. 110-374, pt. 1, at 20 (2007).
“The Committee adopted by voice vote an amendment in the nature of a substitute offered
by Chairman Miller and reported the bill favorably as amended by a vote of 33-9 to the
House of Representatives.” Id.
141 H.R. 1424, 110th Cong. § 512(c)(2) (2008) (enacted).  Cost exemption (i) 2% of the first
year, and (ii) 1% of each subsequent years, as determined by plan actuaries. Id.
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gives up in potential tax revenue to inspire corporations to insure their workers,
currently about $200 million per year.142
The Wellstone Act brings us one step closer to having mental health dis-
eases insured in the same manner as allopathic medicine is insured.  This is
important because the majority of scientific evidence clearly proves “mental
illnesses represent real diseases of the brain.”143  For example, “[g]enetic muta-
tions and unlucky combinations of normal genes contribute to the risk of autism
and schizophrenia,” just like physical ailments caused by genetic mutations.144
As such, health care costs and coverage should not be based on an arbitrary line
distinguishing between a mental healthcare and allopathic medicine.  In both
cases, people are sick and in need of care.  In both cases, when people receive
the necessary treatment, people have the potential to get better and re-enter
society as productive and independent citizens.
B. The Wellstone Act Still Leaves Room for Potential Disparities
As promising as the Wellstone Act may be, obstacles remain.  This section
discusses why employers should recognize offering broad mental health cover-
age to their employees redounds to their benefit.
Because of comprises between Congress and other vested interests, includ-
ing business and insurance leaders,145 an employer may choose not to cover
certain mental health treatments under the Wellstone Act.146  Opponents were
less hostile towards the Act after the House members agreed not to require
mental health plans to cover all conditions specified in the Diagnostic and Sta-
tistical Manual of Mental Disorders IV (“DSM”),147 a diagnostic manual last
published by the American Psychiatric Association in 2000, and used by psy-
chiatrists, psychologists, and other behavioral health care workers to help diag-
nose and treat patients.148
142 Tax expenditures are defined in the law as ‘‘‘revenue losses attributable to provisions of
the Federal tax laws which allow a special exclusion, exemption, or deduction from gross
income or which provide a special credit, a preferential rate of tax, or a deferral of liabil-
ity.’’’ EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE U.S., ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES,
BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2007, at 285 (2006) (noting
that tax deductible employer contributions to medical insurance premiums and tax-free
insurance reimbursements for employees’ medical care is estimated to be about 900 million
dollars from 2007-2011).
143 Pear, supra note 131.
144 Id.
145 Bruce Josten, Executive Vice President for Government Affairs, complained that the
House version of the bill would “constrain employers’ flexibility in plan offerings, and ulti-
mately, cause employers to cut or curtail voluntary benefit offerings.”  Kevin Diaz, House to
Vote on Cause Wellstone Championed, STAR TRIB., Mar. 5, 2008, at A9.  To pressure Con-
gress, he threatened to count House members’ votes in the chamber’s annual ratings score-
card. Id.
146 H.R. 1424, 110th Cong. § 512 (c)(2) (2008) (enacted).
147 AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISOR-
DERS (4th ed. 2000).
148 Id. at xxiii.
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Although federal employees and members of Congress have insurance
programs mandating coverage for all illness listed in the DSM,149 business
leaders strongly opposed this mandate in the Wellstone Act because this meant
“[b]usinesses [would] be faced with the choice of covering every single mental
or substance abuse disorder listed in the diagnostic manual, or nothing at all.
[And] [n]either choice [was] appealing.”150  Under the Wellstone Act, employ-
ers can choose which mental illnesses to cover in their insurance plans, versus
having to insure against every DSM listing; this compromise represents a mid-
dle-ground to the unappealing “all or nothing” approach.151  Even though crit-
ics note that the DSM includes conditions such as caffeine intoxication and
sleep disorders resulting from jet lag, employers may elect to exclude less con-
troversial illnesses like eating disorders, attention deficits, and antisocial
psychoses.152  Addiction treatment does not have to be covered; the law simply
requires parity of benefits if it is included in the plan.153  Potentially, employers
could eliminate coverage for certain significant and prominent mental illnesses,
thereby making the Act’s purpose null and void.
The problem arises when employers choose to arbitrarily exclude illnesses
based on stereotypes, false assumptions, or costs.  Employers typically overes-
timate the cost of providing mental health insurance.154  Based on preliminary
data regarding parity coverage, the total number of mental and physical health
claims should decrease, and a firm’s premiums should actually drop.155  Fur-
thermore, employers are encouraged to provide coverage because data indicates
a positive correlation between behavioral insurance parity and such utilitarian
measures as employee absenteeism, over-use of other physical health insurance
benefits, and employee productivity.156  The effect occurs because enhanced
behavioral health care creates a healthier, cheaper, and more productive
workforce.157
149 See, e.g., Rush Holt, Insurance Should Cover Mentally Ill (Mar. 9, 2008), http://
www.rushholt.com/node/188 (last visited Aug. 12, 2009) (“The Paul Wellstone Mental
Health and Addiction Equity Act would require that all Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders illnesses be covered, rather than letting insurance companies determine
their own scope of coverage.  This is the same coverage requirements that we as Members of
Congress receive under our federal employee health plan and our constituents deserve no
less coverage”).
150 E. Neil Trautwein, a Vice President of trade group National Retail Federation helped
negotiate the compromise bill.  Pear, supra note 131.
151
“It appears each individual group plan gets to decide WHICH mental illness to cover!
No DSM definitions of mental illness are mentioned whatsoever.  Can you imagine a Health
plan deciding WHICH cancers or WHICH heart problems to cover?”  Posting by Anony-
mous to NAMIblog, http://blog.nami.org/2008/03/mental-health-parity.html (Aug. 16, 2008,
14:30 EST).
152 See generally Trapp, supra note 6.
153 Id.
154 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MENTAL HEALTH PARITY ACT:  DESPITE NEW FEDERAL
STANDARDS, MENTAL HEALTH BENEFITS REMAIN LIMITED 16-18 (2000), available at http://
www.gao.gov/archive/2000/he00095.pdf (“Our findings corroborate past studies’ estimates
that implementing federal parity would have a negligible effect on employers’ claims
costs.”).
155 Id.
156 See infra Part IV.B.
157 See infra Part IV.B.
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IV. POSITIVE EFFECTS OF THE NEW LAWS
The new laws should have at least two positive effects.  First, the mandate
that mental health coverage be identical to other kinds of health care coverage
under the Wellstone Act, and the expansion of the ADAAA to cover the kinds
of psychiatric care previously limited or excluded could minimize stereotypes
about the mentally ill.  Second, the laws should reduce employer costs in
general.
A. The New Laws Should Result in Fewer Stereotypes
The Wellstone Act and the ADAAA both express (at least) an intent to
reduce stereotypes.  This section will discuss the pervasiveness of such stereo-
types, their bases and detrimental effects, and provide legislative history that
offers hope of change to mental health sufferers.
In 1999, the Surgeon General of the United States prepared a report on the
state of mental health.158  Several authors, including the directors at the Sub-
stance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration and the Center for
Mental Health Services, wrote a foreword in a report to the Surgeon General,
complaining that “despite unprecedented knowledge gained in just the past
three decades about the brain and human behavior, mental health is often an
afterthought and illnesses of the mind remain shrouded in fear and misunder-
standing.”159  At that time, estimates showed that “about 28% of the U.S. adult
population in any year has a diagnosable mental or addictive disorder, yet only
8% [seek] treatment,”160 in part because of stigma.161
Much of the stigma is based on misperceptions.  A recent survey found
that  “seventy-one percent of the general population thought that mental illness
resulted from an emotional weakness; sixty-five percent thought bad parenting
caused mental illness; and forty-five percent thought victims of mental illness
could ‘will it’ away.”162  Two surveys conducted by social science researchers
found the public’s current opinion toward mental illness more negative than
public opinion over half a century ago.163  In those reports, only ten percent of
the general public thought mental illness “had a biological basis or involved the
brain.”164  American society heaps blame upon mental illness sufferers, per-
158 Satcher, supra note 16.
159 Id.
160 Jonathan Klick & Sara Markowitz, Are Mental Health Insurance Mandates Effective?:
Evidence from Suicides 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9994, 2003),
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w9994.
161 Charity Felts, Comment, Dealing with a Depressed Workforce:  Are American Employ-
ers Doing Enough to Support the Mental Health Challenges Affecting Today’s Employees?,
9 SCHOLAR 119, 130 (2006).
162 Maria A. Morrison, Changing Perceptions of Mental Illness and the Emergence of
Expansive Mental Health Parity Legislation, 45 S.D. L. REV. 8, 10 (2000).
163 Jo C. Phelan et al., Public Conceptions of Mental Illness in 1950 and 1996:  What is
Mental Illness and Is It to be Feared?, 41 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 188, 197-98 (2000)
(comparing survey results from 1950 and 1996 as to whether people believe the mentally ill
are violent).
164 STEPHEN M. STAHL, ESSENTIAL PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 136-37 & 137 tbl.5-1 (2d ed.
2000).
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ceiving them as choosing not to control their psychological well-being.165
Many people also consider mentally ill individuals as potentially violent,
regardless of studies showing the mentally ill are “no more violent than the
general population.”166  According to National Alliance for the Mentally Ill, an
advocacy group, eighty-seven percent of Americans state television is their
“primary source of information about mental illness.”167  Mental illness stereo-
types are common in American television programs:  the mentally ill are por-
trayed as evil, psychotic killers, or ridiculed fools; mental illness is depicted as
a con.168
Reduction of stigma is important because stigma causes real discrimina-
tion against the mentally ill in areas such as housing, jobs, and custody of
children.  A recent study concludes that stigma against the mentally ill exacer-
bates mental health problems, thereby impeding managements’ ability to
improve the workplace.169
The Wellstone Act aims to reduce stigma by normalizing mental ill-
ness.170  As Rosalyn Carter, former First Lady and mental health rights activist,
summarized during House hearings on the bill, “I have always believed that if
insurance covered mental illnesses it would be all right to have them.  This may
be the reason stigma has remained so pervasive, because these illnesses are
treated differently from other health conditions.”171  The Act strives to replace
stigma with compassion and sympathy.  House co-sponsor Patrick Kennedy
(D-R.I.) acknowledged, “[n]o one voluntarily chooses to live the kind of sordid,
165 Alison Bass, Stigma Against Mental Illness Persists Despite New Research, HOUS.
CHRON., Feb. 16, 1992, at 3 (noting that “many Americans still hold deeply ingrained beliefs
that people with schizophrenia, depression and other severe mental disease are frightening
and somehow to blame for their fate”).  Other countries, such as Mexico, India, and Great
Britain, appear to be more tolerant of mental illness than the United States and view mental
illness as something outside a person’s control. Id.
166 Tom Siegfried & Sue Goetinck, Association Between Violence, Mental Illness Disputed
(1996), http://www.pendulum.org/articles/articles_dmn_violence.html (“[S]ome studies
show that people with mental illness are no more violent than people in general.”).
167 Donald L. Diefenbach, The Portrayal of Mental Illness on Prime-Time Television, 25 J.
COMMUNITY PSYCHOL. 289, 290 (1997).
168 In the movie Psycho, “[w]e learn at the end that “Mother” is Norman himself who devel-
oped a split personality after murdering his real mother and her lover in a fit of jealousy.”
IMDb, Biography for Norman Bates (Character) from Psycho (1960), http://www.imdb.com/
character/ch0003067/bio (last visited Aug. 12, 2009).  For an example of people serving the
mentally ill as evil, consider Hannibal Lecter, a “a brilliant psychiatrist . . . [and] cannibalis-
tic serial killer.”  IMDb, Biograpy for Dr. Hannibal Lecter (Character) from The Silence of
the Lambs (1991), http://www.imdb.com/character/ch0001399/bio (last visited Aug. 13,
2009).
169 See Steven F. Cyboran & Ruth Donahue, How to Improve the Behavioral Health of an
Organization, PERSPECTIVES , Oct. 2007, http://www.sibson.com/publications/perspectives/
volume_15_issue_3/behavioral_health.html.
170 David Wellstone, son of the late Minnesota U.S. Senator, who first introduced the
mental health and addiction parity bill back in 1996, called the legislation a “step into the
new century” and a “first step to taking away the stigma of the people who are affected.”
Marisa Helms, Wellstone’s Landmark Mental-Health Parity:  What’s Ahead for the Law,
MINNPOST, Oct. 7, 2008, http://www.minnpost.com/stories/2008/10/07/3797/.
171 The Paul Wellstone Mental Health and Addiction Equity Act of 2007: Hearing on H.R.
1424 Before the Subcomm. on Health, Employment, Labor and Pensions, 110th Cong. 20
(2007) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Rosalynn Carter, former First Lady).
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painful, destructive life [led by] . . . people who are alcoholics and addicts or
people who are depressed or people who are suffering from schizophrenia or
bipolar disorder [or] . . . obsessive-compulsive disorder. . . .”172
The ADAAA expresses a parallel intent, perhaps even more emphatically.
The clearly stated purpose of the Act is “to carry out the ADA’s objectives of
providing ‘a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of
discrimination’ and ‘clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing
discrimination’ by reinstating a broad scope of protection to be available under
the ADA.”173  Time will tell if the new laws reduce such stereotypes, but such
words offer hope to millions.
B. The New Laws Will Reduce Employer Costs for Mental Illnesses
Another positive effect of the new laws is that costs to businesses should
decrease.  This section first discusses the cost to employers, in the billions of
dollars, for providing improper mental health coverage to employees, either
through direct or indirect costs.  Second, the new laws, which enable businesses
to provide the same benefits for mental health as for allopathic illnesses, will
reduce employer costs.
Data gathered over the last two decades reflect the costliness to business in
failing to provide mental health parity in employment.  In 1995, lost productiv-
ity and worker absenteeism as a result of clinical depression cost American
businesses $28.8 billion annually.174  In 1996, 7.8 million workers were men-
tally ill, and their annual cost to businesses per employee as a result of their
mental illness was $4200.175  In 1997, employers annually paid $180 billion as
a result of presenteeism (i.e., coming to work but performing below par) and
$118 billion for absenteeism.176  Figures from 2003 highlighted workplace-
related costs of mental illnesses at approximately $70 billion annually, stem-
ming from absenteeism, turnover and retraining expenses, lower productivity,
and increased medical costs.177  In 2007, American human resources execu-
tives ranked mental illness as having more effect on indirect costs for employ-
ers than any other health issue.178
In addition, health insurance plans not covering primary mental illness
escalate employers’ costs for co-morbidity conditions.  Health insurance plans
not covering substance abuse treatment, a common co-morbidity condition with
172 Id. at 7 (statement of Rep. Patrick J. Kennedy).
173 ADA Amendments Act of 2008, § 2(b)(1), Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553, 3554
(2008).
174 COAL. FOR FAIRNESS IN MENTAL ILLNESS COVERAGE, EMPLOYERS SHOULD SUPPORT
MENTAL HEALTH PARITY (2003), available at http://www.mhlg.org/business_3-03.pdf [here-
inafter COAL. FOR FAIRNESS].
175 Id.
176 PARTNERSHIP FOR WORKPLACE MENTAL HEALTH & MERITIAN HEALTH, THE PARTNER-
SHIP FOR WORKPLACE MENTAL HEALTH AND MERITAIN HEALTH ANNOUNCE RESULTS OF
EMPLOYEE SURVEY, available at http://www.workplacementalhealth.org/partnershipMeritain
HealthSurveyReport.pdf (last visited Aug. 18, 2009).
177 COAL. FOR FAIRNESS, supra note 174.
178 Press Release, Partnership for Workplace Mental Health, HR Executives Rank Mental
Illness #1 for Effect on Indirect Costs (May 31, 2007) (available at http://www.workplace-
mentalhealth.org/employer_resources/InnerworkingsSurveyReleasevFINAL530.pdf).
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psychiatric conditions like bipolar disorder and clinical depression, can escalate
allopathic medical costs for the employer.179  Moreover, at least twenty-five
percent of hospital admissions are due to alcoholism-related complications and
sixty-five percent of emergency room visits are for alcohol or other drug related
mental health services, thus costing the employer more, rather than less.180
The World Health Organization found that untreated mental health
problems are by far the most disabling diseases, accounting for more than one-
fifth of all lost days of productive life.181  For example, depressed workers miss
5.6 hours per week of productivity due to absenteeism and presenteeism, com-
pared to 1.5 hours for non-depressed workers.182  Alcohol-related illness and
premature death due to alcoholism cost employers over $129.5 billion in lost
productivity per year.183
Providing the same coverage for mental health as for allopathic illness,
some researchers posit, results in a lowering of indirect costs for businesses as
well.184  A team of researchers recently studied the effect of increased access to
mental health care.185  They reported, for example:  “From the employer’s per-
spective, enhanced depression care yields a [per capita] net cumulative benefit
of $2895 after 5 years.”186  Other studies also suggest positive results for
employers.  A 1998 study found that giving patients access to outpatient mental
health services resulted in fewer disability claims than plans without.187  In
1999, a four-year study of a plan providing mental health coverage yielded a
four-to-one return on investment after considering absenteeism, turnover, and
medical claims.188  In 2000, one company reported a 48.9 percent decrease in
medical and surgical costs as a result of providing mental health counseling.189
Cost benefit analyses support the conclusion that tangible economic and
productivity returns further justify parity in mental health benefits.  One study
concluded employers net a “potentially meaningful return on investment from
enhanced depression treatment” from providing mental health coverage, espe-
cially in firms that rely on “team production, expensive substitute labor, and/or
179 Yehuda Sasson, Miriam Chopra, Eran Harrari, Keren Amitai & Joseph Zohar, Bipolar
Comorbidity: From Diagnostic Dilemmas to Therapeutic Challenge, 6 INT’L J. NEURO-
PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 139, 139-44 (2003) (“There is convincing evidence that rates of
substance use and anxiety disorders are higher among patients with bipolar disorder com-
pared to their rates in the general population.  The interaction between anxiety disorders and
substance use goes both ways: patients with bipolar disorder have a higher rate of substance
use and anxiety disorder, and vice versa.”). See generally John V. Jacobi, Parity and Differ-
ence:  The Value of Parity Legislation for the Seriously Mentally Ill, 29 AM. J.L. & MED.
185 (2003).
180 Sasson, supra note 179 at 142.
181 Hearing, supra note 171, at 10 (statement of Rep. Patrick J. Kennedy).
182 Id.
183 Id.
184 Nat’l Advisory Mental Health Council, Healthcare Reform for Americans with Severe
Mental Illnesses:  Report of the National Advisory Mental Health Council, 150 AM. J. PSY-
CHIATRY 1447, 1457 (1993).
185 Philip S. Wang et al., The Costs and Benefits of Enhanced Depression Care to Employ-
ers, 63 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 1345 (2006).
186 Id. at 1345.
187 COAL. FOR FAIRNESS, supra note 174.
188 Id.
189 Id.
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output shortfall penalties; and low turnover rates.”190  As discussed above,
“[e]vidence is mounting that worker depression may have its greatest impact on
productivity losses, including increased absenteeism and short-term disability,
higher turnover, and suboptimal performance at work.”191  By providing
mental health parity, the new laws will dramatically improve cost benefits for
employers.192
It is no surprise then that some employer and insurance groups supported
the new parity law in the Wellstone Act.193  Businesses assert they are willing
to coordinate physical and mental health management.194
V. CONCLUSION
From the time of Elijah, the mentally ill have suffered stigma.  Imagine a
company that could refuse to hire a woman, train a Latino, or promote an Evan-
gelical.  Then remember that, most often, under the original ADA and Sutton,
such discrimination against the mentally ill was tolerated, or even sanctioned.
Conceptualize an insurance policy limiting heart patients to one hospital stay
per year, or excluding care for lung cancer patients because their personal
weakness to smoke contributed to their ill health.  Then remember that arbitrary
limits on mental health treatment and benefits were commonplace before the
Wellstone Act.  The potential loss of talents of those with mental illness but
without financial resources to society is both inefficient and unjust.195  Last
year, while Congress debated the amendment, Rosalyn Carter excoriated Con-
gress:  “[I]t is unconscionable in our country and morally unacceptable to treat
20 percent of our population . . .  . . . as though they were not worthy of care
. . . [t]hen we pay the price for this folly in homelessness, lives lost, families
torn apart, loss of productivity.196
Put simply, Congress was right to enact both the ADAAA and the Well-
stone Act.  The benefit of assuring employees they need not hide their mental
illnesses and can afford to receive psychiatric treatment suggests that social
practices must be judged without regard to their economic efficiency.  Good
will and faith in the current workforce has its own intrinsic value. The ADAAA
and the Wellstone Act bring the mentally ill a more expansive definition of
190 Anthony T. Lo Sasso, Kathryn Rost & Arne Beck, Modeling the Impact of Enhanced
Depression Treatment on Workplace Functioning and Costs:  A Cost–Benefit Approach, 44
MED. CARE 352, 356-57 (2006).
191 Ron Z. Goetzel et al., The Business Case for Quality Mental Health Services:  Why
Employers Should Care About the Mental Health and Well-Being of Their Employees, 44 J.
OCCUPATIONAL & ENVTL. MED. 320 (2002).
192 See Cyboran & Donahue, supra note 169 (“Reduc[ing] spending on behavioral health
services [as] a cost-cutting tactic eventually backfires by causing an increase in overall
healthcare expenditures.”).
193 Alison Bell, Experts:  New Parity Law May Not Cause Severe Employer Anxiety, NAT’L
UNDERWRITER LIFE & HEALTH, Nov. 2008, at 48, 48.
194 Id.
195 According to Mike Faenza, President of the National Mental Health Association, an
advocacy organization for patients and professionals:  “[T]he bottom line is that people with
mental illnesses are the last [remaining] class of American citizens that are blatantly discrim-
inated against in any social institution.” Of Sound Mind and Body, supra note 18.
196 Hearing, supra note 171, at 17-18 (statement of Rosalynn Carter, former First Lady).
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disability and business a stronger bottom-line.  Myths and stereotypes die hard,
and the current economic climate may lead to less health insurance in the work-
place.  Although there are many steps left to take, the ADAAA and Wellstone
Act bring us one step closer to achieving mental health parity.
